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By the end of 1974 no section of Ugandan life
had been left unaffected by the crisis which had
been developing since the end of the 1960s. The
military had been continuously purged since the
coup of January 1971 and Amin had faced a
number of attempts to unseat him. The state
apparatus had been seriously undermined by its
senior elements being fired or physically elimi-
nated or leaving the country. The shortage of
foreign exchange had become so intense that raw
materials and spare parts had declined to very
low levels, creating inflation of more than 100
per cent per year. Infra-structure services and
supplies of implements to the rural sector had
broken down, reducing its productivity, and thus
the supply of foodstuffs to the towns and of
exports to foreign markets. The international
confrontation over the Asians had led to the
withdrawal of most foreign support for the
regime. The British had refused to renew their
aid contributions and their personnel had left as
their contracts expired. The Scandinavians and
the Canadians had withdrawn their personnel
more hurriedly while American aid was also
reduced to negligible proportions. By the latter
part of 1973 it appeared that the only foreign
sources of support were the Arab countries and
Yugoslavia. In 1974 Amin was apparently losing
his links even with the Arab world and had
become almost totally isolated.
Explanation for this crisis is often sought in
Amin's personality. He is considered insane and
Uganda's problems are entirely attributed to this
insanity. Although it may be true that a great deal
can be put down to particular decisions taken
since he came to power, much more can be
attributed to the cumulative effects of the problems
which Uganda had to confront in the period
immediately prior to the coup. It can be argued
that most of the problems which Amin has faced
and been unable to solve were created for him
by the nature of the conflict in Uganda during the
previous period. It can even be argued that these
conflicts are the direct outcome of the problems
of underdevelopment which can be seen at work
in most of the less developed countries in tropical
Africa, and that Uganda is not so much a special
case but an extreme one; a case in which a num-
ber of contradictions characteristic of other
African situations have come together to produce
a crisis of an extreme type. For this reason it
is useful to look more closely at Uganda where
these problems manifest themselves so clearly.
The Ugandan crisis can be seen as the outcome
of a period of intensified internal competition for
resources in a situation where the structural
changes in the economy were not sufficient to
increase productivity to the point where it could
meet the demands being made upon it. To under-
stand this process we need to explain both the
source of the demands for additional resources
and also the factors which have inhibited the
growth in productivity.
The continued underdevelopment of Uganda can
best be understood in relation to three primary
contradictions. These are first the contradiction
between the requirements of international capi-
talism operating inside Uganda and the growth
of the national capitalist class; second, the internal
conflicts between different sections of the national
petit bourgeoisie, in particular the conflicts be-
tween different regional groupings of that class;
third, the contradications between the demands
and needs of the bourgeoisie and those of the
mass of the population, especially the small
peasantry. Before looking at each of these con-
tradictions in detail, it is necessary to note the
crucial role played by the state in mediating
between the different elements involved, and, more
particularly, in assisting and encouraging the
development of the African petit bourgeoisie
itself.
From the beginning of the colonial period the
state has performed a crucial extractive role. It
has been responsible for appropriating a large
percentage of the surplus created by the peasantry
and of allocating this to the further development
of the bureaucracy and of the private sector.
Control over the state has therefore been of
critical importance in determining the success or
failure of both capitalism as a whole and, more
especially, of particular fractions (international and
regionally based national) within it. During the
early colonial period the state intervened deci-
sively to strengthen the competitive position of the
large colonial and (subsequently) Asian com-
panies. It was of great importance in reducing the
competitive power of the small Asian company
and more especially of the potential African
entrepreneur. In the later colonial period African
entrepreneurs began to pentrate the market despite
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the very intense competition which they faced from
the Asian sector. They were also able to acquire
positions in the bureaucracy, usually at the lower
level. These positions they could then use as a
means of capital accumulation which enabled
them to establish themselves in independent
business.
This process was rapidly intensified after inde-
pendence when large numbers of Africans were
recruited into the more highly paid sections of
the bureaucracy and the nationalized industries.
These positions gave the iqdividuals concerned
access to substantial amounts of capital which
they could then use to operate in the private
sector. Given the commitment of the Obote
government to the full development of an African
capitalist class it can be seen that access to the
state apparatus was an essential prerequisite to
success in the private sector. The state and the
whole bureaucratic apparatus therefore became
the primary agent in the creation of the African
petit bourgeoisie. At the same time both the
international capitalist sector and the pre-capitalist
peasantsector looked to the state to provide them
with the services and facilities which they required
in order to operate effectively. Politics became a
battleground fought over by these different
sections, and control of the state apparatus be-
came the most important prize to be won. This
fact explains the intensity of the conflict at the
central political level, and the instability of the
political organizations set up at that level. It also
indicates why our analysis must focus very
directly upon the relationship between the state
and various classes and fractions of classes
involved in the competition for control over its
power.
The international context
The end of the colonial period left Uganda with
an economy the major features of which were
very similar to those of much of the rest of Africa
at the same stage. The major part of activity in
the cash economy w.as devoted to the production
of agricultural exports. The bulk of these were
produced by small peasants with plantation pro-
duction playing a relatively small part. During the
1950s a small manufacturing sector had been
built up, based on collaboration between expatri-
ate, Asian and state capital. Commerce and the
processing of agricultural commodities was in the
hands of an Asian class most of whom did not
intend to take out Ugandan citizenship. This
group had also been responsible for processing
agricultural commodities like cotton and coffee,
but during the 1960s the bulk of these activities
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were transferred to African co-operatives. These
co-operatives were organized on increasingly
bureaucratic lines and the conditions of service
in them were very similar to those in the state
sector itself.
The African bourgeoisie therefore grew up within
the context of an essentially externally-oriented
economy. The educational system played a major
part in this process of recruitment and the bulk of
the teaching in the secondary and tertiary sectors
was supplied by American or British personnel.
During the 1960s Britain's dominance in Uganda
was gradually reduced as the influence of the
United States and of smaller countries like the
Scandinavian countries and Israel grew. During
the same period the foreign controlled manufac-
turing sector of the Kenyan economy expanded
very rapidly and captured a large share of the
Ugandan market.
No effort was made during the early years after
independence to change the basic nature of the
relationship which had been set up with overseas
capital during the l950s. Instead the government
attempted to increase the inflow of aid in order
to improve infra-structure services and thereby
further expand agricultural exports, to expand
the manufacturing sector on the basis of import
substitution, and to Africanize personnel at the
higher levels of the state bureaucracy and of the
foreign private sector. Substantial inflows of
capital did occur. In agriculture the bulk of these
went into the creation of large farms and the
establishment of a tractor hire service. The new
technology proved to be relatively unsuitable in
Ugandan conditions and productivity increased
very little, if at all. Investment in manufacturing,
on the other hand, took the form of capital-
intensive technology so that substantial increases
in production were secured with relatively small
increase in employment. The expansion of pro-
duction simply replaced existing imports and
benefited only a limited section of the population.
The Africanization of the larger corporations and
the civil service greatly increased the African
professional class but it did not go anywhere
near meeting the demands for employment at this
level, since the output of secondary school gradu-
ates had expanded so rapidly by the late 1960s
that the competition for jobs was greatly
intensified.
The impact of foreign capital upon the society as
a whole was therefore very limited, but it was
of crucial importance to the further development
of the small African elite which had taken over
the state at independence. Financing the state
sector depended very heavily upon growing aid
subventionsthese underwrote a continued
growth in the bureaucratic apparatus and the
relatively high import-based standards of living
of those who controlled it. Access to imported
technology provided a basis for the expansion of
the para-statal manufacturing sector in which
Africans initially established themselves, since
they did not have the capital nor the technological
skills (given the essentially literary education they
had been bequeathed by the British) to move into
this sector independently. And especially after the
political crisis of 1966, continued access to
imported armaments was of crucial importance
in enabling the. whole state system, and in par-
ticular the group which controlled it, to protect
itself from competition and to continue to extract
tribute from the population as a whole.
On one level, therefore, the new African elite
depended on and could operate in alliance with
international capital in order to ensure an ex-
panded flow and equitable distribution of the
spoils extracted from the rest of society. But on
another, the relationship was fraught with con-
tradictions. The newly promoted politicians,
soldiers and bureaucrats had to use their share of
the spoils to become capitalists in their own right.
The underdeveloped state of the rural areas from
which they came made it possible for them to
move into various forms of enterprise with
relatively limited resources. Second and third
wives were set to work running small shops in the
front rooms of newly built houses, wattle and
daub batteries were erected for chicken produc-
tion, grinding mills were set up to process locally
produced millet and maize. Access to various
forms of legal, semi-legal, and illegal handouts
from the state and associated institutions (banks,
insurance companies, state trading organizations)
enabled some of the elite to become competitors
in the main urban centres. By the end of the
l960s this process had produced, albeit still in a
somewhat hidden and limited form, a petit
bourgeoise element in African society whose pri-
mary motivation was no longer simply bureau-
cratic preferment (though this would remain
important for as long as the state's role in primi-
tive capital accumulation continued to be
significant) but also expansion within and in
accordance with the requirements of the capitalis-
tic mode proper.
Now the technological and political backwardness
of this class ensured that it would continue to
depend upon internationäl capitalism proper. On
the other hand, however, the limitations imposed
upon its expansion by the slow growth in pro-
ductivity in the country as a whole1 meant that
it would be unable to expand at a speed sufficient
to satisfy its requirements. But while this overall
failure in expansion (and more especially the
form taken by such expansion as was occurring)
was the fundamental reason for this, those
involved readily attributed their failure to the
presence of the Asian commercial class in their
midst. The Asian community, dominant in com-
merce, small manufacturing and a small section
of agriculture, were the non-commissioned officers
of foreign capital. They were a successful, even
brilliant, intermediate stratum. They had, for
many generations and with relatively little state
support, dominated exactly those areas of the
economy which the emergent African bourgeoisie
could hope to penetrate. Their failure to estab-
lish effective social and political linkage with the
African petit bourgeoisie exposed,the true nature
of their role as foreign intermediaries and did not
allow them to cloak these activities under some
form of nationalist or popular ideology.
During the early 1960s the community had
taken advantage of convertibility to export very
large amounts of capital. From 1965, with the
introduction of exchange control, they had in-
vested more heavily in property development and
in import-substituting industry,2 They had
attempted to buy support from the African poli-
tical leadership, and there is no doubt that sub-
stantial sections of this leadership were closely
involved with Asian capital in a wide range of
activities.
But the limited resources available for distribu-
tion in this way and the growing demands from
the African petit bourgeoisie meant that the
government had constantly to look for support
beyond those groups which had been effectively
bought off in this way. This problem was intensi-
fied by the necessity to resolve the regional issue
(which will be dealt with in the next section), but
would have existed even without it. Thus while
many members of the Obote Cabinet were them-
selves extensively involved in collaborative ven-
1 To substantiate this proposition we can point to the
following:
Growth in formal wage employment from 264,000 in
1962 to only 312,000 in 1970.
No effective increase in the contribution of manufactur-
ing to GD? 1961-69 (9 per cent to 9.2 per cent).
Growth rates in 1966 to 1970 manufacturing (in constant
prices) of only 3 per cent pa. in manufacturing, 4.5 per
cent in agriculture and 4.4 per cent in GDP, compared
with a population growth of 3.8 per cent.
Sources: Second and Third Five Year Plans; Background to
the Budget, 1970-7?; 1971 Statistical Abstract.
2 The Second Five Year Plan shows a substantial increase in
Gross Capital formation in 1965 (p. 24) and the expansion
in Asian owned property in Kampala was clearly visible
between 1965 and 1967.
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tures with leading Asian capitalists, it became
necessary to attempt to transfer sections of the
economy from Asian to African control. In the
period up to 1967 the whole of cotton processing
and a substantial section of coffee processing were
transferred to African co-operatives or private
capital. Loan schemes were set up to assist
African traders; a state trading corporation was
established to give them access to wholesale
supplies and in the process distributed large
amounts to businesesmen with strong political
linkages. After 1968 licensing was introduced to
reduce the ability of Asian traders to operate,
especially in the rural sector, and at the same time
pressure on Britain to admit British citizens of
Asian descent was intensified.
The policies were administered with an extra-
ordinary lack of skill, while the ineffectiveness of
the aspirant African petit bourgeoisie combined
with the immense efficiency of the Asian group
to ensure that very small benefits accrued to the
regime from the largess which it was still able to
distribute. Further, the intensification of the attack
upon the Asian community increased the outflow
of capital and thus aggravated the problem. By
the end of the 1 960s the willingness of the Asians
to reinvest locally had again declined very sharply
and in 1970 the outflow of gross private capital
increased by more than 60 per cent (Third Five
Year Plan, p. 35). Obote, becoming increasingly
isolated by 1967 and constantly confronted by a
threat to his position from the army, attempted
to increase support by a 'move to the left' which
involved a great deal of meaningless popular
rhetoric, but also a decision to take a controlling
interest in the main foreign businesses and more
especially the banks and insurance companies.
This can be seen as an attempt to obtain more
direct control over the credit facilities required
to continue the expansion of the African petit
bourgeoisie, but those elements of that class which
had already built up a successful relationship with
the foreign sector (and there were many of
these, especially in the south) probably saw this
move as a potential threat to their own position.
Whatever the effect upon the African petit
bourgeoisie, however, there is no doubt that the
move alienated foreign support and further in-
creased the capital outflow.
By 1971, therefore, the regime had alienated
foreign capital, the Asian intermediaries, and a
substantial section of the African petit bourgeoisie
itself. These developments were reflected in a
growing shortage of foreign exchange which,
given the society's technological dependence, at
once meant yet further declines in the ability to
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expand productivity and support. The coup, and
especially Obote's inability to mobilise any form
of opposition thereafter, was simply the result of
this underlying situation. What was not so clearly
recognised by the interests which greeted Amin
with such uncritical enthusiasm was that he
would be presented with precisely the same set
of contradictions and that the resources available
to his predecessor to deal with them had now
been reduced to almost nothing. Had Obote won,
he too would have confronted a major crisis and
would have had to take drastic action to deal
with it, although he would probably not have had
the audacity to undertake the wholesale elimina-
tion of the Asian community.
The regional issue
The Ugandan economy developed very unequally
during the colonial period. Growth was concen-
trated in the south east where cotton was succeeded
by coffee after the Second World War. This devel-
opment was associated with an equivalent ex-
pansion of the educational system and the early
emergence of African commerical and political
activities, The development of the north and west,
on the other hand, mostly took place after the
Second World War. lt was only during this period
that the transport network was effectively ex-
tended to those areas and that it became possible
for them to enter the cash economy in an effective
way. The major urban centres were also concen-
trated in the south-east and it was to these centres
that manufacturing industry was attracted in the
period after 1952.
Regionalism manifested itself in the period up
to 1961 through the development of strong insti-
tutions of local government. The most important
of these were those associated with the extension
of Buganda neo-traditionalism into the modern
period. At independence the constitution provided
various districts with a high degree of autonomy
and in particular gave the Baganda a special
federal status within the constitution as a whole.
There is little doubt that the political leadership
ici the south saw the maintenance of strong local
government institutions as the best means of
defending their interests against potential en-
croachments from the north and west. They
recognized, however, the need to participate in
central government institutions in order to expand
their share of national resources.
By the late l950s the development of education
in the north was sufficient to allow a small group
to come forward capable of forming political
organizations and of competing for power at the
national level. This group recognized that they
had to obtain control over the national govern-
ment in order to rectify the imbalance of econo-
mic growth which had taken place up to that
point, and created in the Uganda People's Con-
gress (UPC) a political organization capable of
operating effectively at the centre. During the first
half of the l960s, the UPC leadership was able to
form sufficient alliances with other groups in the
society to capture a majority in parliament and to
get control over the state apparatus. More im-
portant, from the long term point of view, was
the fact that the army had been traditionally
recruited from the north of the country. The
Africanization of the officer corps took place
very rapidly in the last years of the l950s and the
first years of the 1960s. This initially involved the
upgrading of non-commissioned officers with
relatively low levels of education ànd exclusively
recruited from northern tribes, of whom Amin
is the most notable example. Subsequently an
attempt was made to recruit better educated
people into the officer corps, and southerners
were drawn into its junior ranks. But in 1966
still both senior and lower levels of the army were
occupied virtually exclusively by northerners.
There is also little doubt that Obote took great
care to see that the old patterns of recruitment
would not be significantly interfered with.
During the first half of the 1960s most of Obote's
efforts were devoted to breaking down the inde-
pendent power of the district elites. At the same
time the southern leadership was organizing itself
in an attempt to eliminate northern control and
take over the central government. These conflicts
culminated in the 1966 confrontation when Obote
arrested five of his senior Ministers, in order to
forestall a takeover, and subsequently used the
power of the army to break the political influence
of the Kabaka in Buganda and of other district
leaders throughout the country. His dependence
upon the army and in particular upon the political
support of Amin during this process was very
clear. He was unable to hpld the elections due in
1966, and initially at least had very little support
outside the main areas in the north frOm which
he and his close colleagues had been recruited.
The move to the left, the attack upon the Asian
commercial class and the commitment to holding
new elections in 1971 can be seen as an attempt
on Obote's part to recapture the political support
which he had had at the beginning of the l960s,
but his ability to do this was, as ever, constrained
by his limited resources. The attack upon the
foreign sector alienated as many groups as it
attracted and his traditional enemies in Buganda
and other parts of the south could not forget, or
forgive him for, 1966. In particular, he found
himself increasingly threatened by the strength of
Amin's position within the army and by its poten-
tial internal conflicts. In 1971 he appears to have
planned to eliminate Amin from the army. This
was to have been carried out during a trip to the
Corthmonwealth Conference. Amin, however,
proved to be a more astute tactician than Obote
had anticipated and was able to mobilize sections
of the army drawn from his own area of West
Nile and to eliminate the Obote groups. After a
short battle, the Obote faction was defeated and
Amin took power.
Amin appeared initially to have the support of the
leading elements from the south, despite the fact
that he had commanded the attack upon the
Kabaka's palace in Buganda in 1966. For a brief
period it seemed that he might be able to over-
come the regional problem, but this was not to be.
He, like his predecessor, had very few resources
left to distribute. The weakness of his position in
the army meant that he had necessarily to make
considerable concessions to the areas of West Nile
from which he drew most of his support. Unless
he could find new resources to distribute he too
would be able to remain in power only by the
exercise of naked physical force. Given the stag-
nation in the economy and the continued leakage
of foreign exchange, the only resource available
to him was the Asian commercial and manufac-
turing sector. It was therefore no accident nor an
act of lunacy which led him to turn in this
direction when he found himself running short of
political credit in the latter part of 1972.
Problem of mass mobilization
The further development of both the foreign and
the national capitalist sectors was dependent upon
the ability to appropriate a growing surplus from
the mass of the population which at the end of
the colonial period was still very largely rural.
This in turn required on the one hand the ability
to attract rural labour into a more productive
manufacturing sector and secondly to expand the
productivity of agricultural production. In fact
during the l960s the growth of the employed
labour force was relatively small, although its
income tended to rise as the capital intensity of
industry increased. From a political point of view
the fact that incomes were increasing in this sec-
tor meant that the government was confronted
with very little overt opposition from the urban
proleteriat. The trade union movement could be
penetrated and its political influence emasculated.
Minimum wage legislation could be effectively
enforced because of the big profits being made
in the manufacturing sector.
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On the other hand, the smallness of this sector and
its high degree of concentration in the southern
part of the country meant there was little general-
ization of its benefits. Those outside it were greatly
attracted by the high level of rewards which it
offered, but were very quickly made aware of the
fact that the number of jobs available was to be
very small. This in turn meant that the importance
of expanding rural productivity was of even
greater importance than it would have been had
the industrial sector been growing more rapidly.
But, as we have seen, the main investment on the
rural sector took the form of imported capital-
intensive technology, which was available only to
a tiny percentage of the rural population. A large
percentage of these resources were also mono-
polized by those who established themselves in
the urban sector and used their influence there to
obtain preferential access. This urban based class
also used their influence to appropriate large
amounts of land and thus increasingly came to
play the part of a new class of settlers. The poli-
tical discontent generated in the poor peasantry by
this process could not make itself felt in political
organization because of this low level of organi-
zation and their inability to make any alliance
with the petit bourgeoisie. It was reflected in their
failure to produce more resources for the mone-
tary economy and this in turn made it impossible
for the government to obtain the additional
surplus which it required to build its support in
the community as a whole.
The growth of large-scale farming in the rural
sector paralleled the development of African
entrepreneurship in the urban sector. Most of the
leading individuals involved in control over the
slate, and in urban and rural capitalism, were the
same. But this emerging class, dependent as it was
upon imported technology and upon the state,
necessarily stood in a contradictory relationship
to the mass of the population concentrated on the
land. lt could not exploit them effectively, either
directly or indirectly, li was unable to create the
capital resources required either to draw the poor
peasantry into paid employment, or to enable
them to develop their own production on an indi-
vidualistic basis. lt could not, in other words,
create an effective capitalist revolution. Yet at the
same time its essentially capitalistic aspirations
meant it could not attempt any other kind of
revolution either. The socialist rhetoric of the late
I 960s in no way limited the process of personal
accumulation on the part of the African petit
bourgeoisie, both those inside and outside the
ruling party. But the nature of their process of
accumulation impoverished the country instead of
expanding productive capacity. The result of this
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basic contradiction was the coup of January 1971,
the Asian exodus of 1972 and the continuing
crisis which can no longer be concealed or over-
come.
Conclusions
The problems and constraints which the new
regime had to confront in 1971 can now be more
clearly identified. The disunity in the army was
ended by the purge of many thousands of Achole
and Langi soldiers (the assumed supporters of the
Obole faction) after the coup, followed by an
extensive purge of the leading political elements
in those two districts. Although this movement
took on large and violent proportions, it can be
argued that the fact that Obole was working in
Dar-es-Salaam to engineer a counter-coup made
something of this sort inevitable. This step, of
course, necessarily alienated many others who
had been associated with the group closest to
Obote. This in turn led to further purges which
necessarily alienated even more people. New
factions developed within the army itself which
was divided on both religious and regional lines.
Those who had initially brought Amin to power
themselves became suspect as it appeared that
they might conspire to eliminate him and establish
some new system of control. The only way in
which they could be stopped was either by their
physical elimination or by moving them out of the
army into senior positions in the bureaucracy or
into private business, where they would pose a
less direct threat to the regime.
By the early part of 1972 the organized African
traders were directly and continuously petitioning
the government for more effective action to elimi-
nate the Asians from the trading sector. By this
time many army officers, like other bureaucrats
and the leading politicians, were extensively
involved in capitalistic agriculture, commerce and
the processing of agricultural commodities, as
described above. They too were being squeezed
by the economic slump and confronted en-
trenched Asian competition.
The exodus of 1972 gave the regime a breathing
space. Almost five thousand businesses had to be
allocated and this represented a very substantial
resource. The unpopularity of the Asian trader,
who was widely regarded as a profiteer, meant
that the resulting support was not confined to the
petit bourgeoisie, but extended both to the urban
working class and the peasantry. These businesses
were allocated during the first part of 1973. Most
of the largest factories, shops and hotels were
allocated to army officers close to the regime, and
many to Muslims from West Nile who were them-
selves close to the army. The rest were apparently
allocated to bureaucrats and politicians who had
been prominent during the Obote period and had
avoided the purge. Suddenly a new class had
moved into prominence. Before 1972, the African
trader and manufacturer had been relatively
invisible. Although many bureaucrats and politi-
cians were building up their own businesses, they
were still primarily regarded as state functionaries.
Now, however, it was the African as trader who
carne to play the leading part in society.
But while the expulsion and transfer of Asian
assets created short term popularity for the
regime, it merely intensified the long-term prob-
1cm. In the first place the way it was carried out,
involving virtual expropriation of a large number
of foreign owned assets, meant a clear break with
the dominant imperial powers. Most of the Asian
traders were in debt to the British banks, and the
expulsion meant that these debts were virtually
cancelled. The manner in which the British
government was forced to admit a large number
of Asian immigrants led to considerable hostility
from the Heath Administration. The cancellation
of existing contracts with foreign suppliers and
the imposition of a new class of businessmen
meant that all of the credit which the Asian
business community had built up over the years
was lost. Foreign suppliers required cash with
orders and this in turn made it more difficult for
the government to control the outflow of foreign
exchange.
The African traders themselves felt very insecure
in their new situation. They recognized that they
owed their business to political intervention and
it could be lost, should there be any change at the
centre. During 1972 and l973 many businesses
were purged by what were believed to be agents
of the government. All these factors tended to
reduce the willingness of the new commercial
class to import goods and to retain the foreign
exchange which they made on the export trade.
Shortages led to a rapid growth in black markets
and in smuggling of essential commodities out of
Uganda into neighbouring territories with harder
currencies. It was widely believed that senior
individuals in the government were heavily in-
volved in all these activities.
Attempts have since been made to reorganize
the control over foreign exchange and improve the
method of obtaining essential commodities from
the outside. But these measures are undermined
by the prevailing sense of insecurity and a ten-
dency for those within the bureaucratic and
political structures to use their official positions
to accumulate foreign and internal resources on
their own behalf. The termination of foreign aid
has also greatly reduced the availability of spare
parts for the machinery required to keep the
economy going. The result of all this is a rapid
run down in the ability of the society to provide
for itself. Many of the new bourgeoisie have
made paper fortunes, a small number of them
have made fortunes which they have been able t
transform into foreign assets. But that inflation is
rapid and the supply of essential commodities has
now become so limited the rest of the community
is suffering a massive reduction in their standards
of life.
To end this decline without a fundamental re-
construction of society three things would be
necessary. The supply of imported technology
(and especially in the short run the spare parts for
existing plants) has to be resumed, the new national
petit bourgeoisie has to be forced to put its
resources into internal development rather than
into external accumulation, and some means has
to be found to expand the productivity of the
poor peasantry as a whole. In the long term the
emergence of a national petit bourgeoisie which
has had to confront a social crisis of this magni-
tude could have positive effects. Uganda, unlike
Kenya and many other African countries, is no
longer managed from the outside and as a result
many have acquired the ability to solve problems
which they would never have acquired under the
tutelage of foreign interests whose primary
interest was surplus extraction. On the other hand
growth can only be resumed where new foreign
resources can be acquired and devoted to pro-
duction rather than destruction.
And here the essential contradictions of client
capitalism stand in the way of any effective
national solution. Foreign resources depend upon
Ihe ability to expand peasant production and this
in turn involves the ability to provide the small
peasant with the technology and the rewards
which will make increased production possible
and worthwhile. But the costs of maintaining the
new petit bourgeoisie and its accompanying state
apparatus are now so large as to make a signi-
ficant diversion of resources to peasants virtually
impossible. This problem is intensified by the
speed at which land is being appropriated by a
new urban class which does not have the techno-
logical or organizational capacity to exploit it
effectively. Until new exports are created it will
be of little importance to international capitalism.
Uganda does not have the mineral or petrochemi-
cal resources which are currently in great demand;
and the national bourgeoisie will be left to fight
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among itself for the ever diminishing resources
which can be extracted from an increasingly
oppressed peasantry and increasingly marginalized
manufacturing sector. This, in turn, will require
increasingly intense acts of repression to keep
the peasantry in brder and increasingly Machia-
vellian political manipulation to contain the
conflicts generated within the different fractions
of the petit bourgeoisie itself.
[he combination of these mutually reinforcing
vicious circles suggests that dependent capitalist
development has reached its logical dead end
more rapidly in Uganda than in many other
African countries where the conjunction of forces
has been different. It is clear that some form of
collective organization of development has become
a necessity and that the present national petit
bourgeoisie shows virtually no ability to achieve
this. On the other hand the colonial and post-
colonial experience has produced no other classes
obviously able to play that role or even to
organize effective resistance to the system of
exploitation. The weakness of the centre is paral-
leled by an even greater weakness of the peri-
phery. The conscious realization of exploitation
has increased very sharply over the past two years,
and the ever-present threats of sudden death (or
more gradual but no less inexorable immiserisa-
tion) have begun to overcome the common ten-
dency to give at least passive support to the
existing state structure and to accept the inevita-
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bility of the existing order of economic, social
and political life. But the vacuum at the level of
political organization is almost total as is the
absence of experience of the politics of resistance.
The regime attempts with total ruthlessness to
crush every attempt in this direction and will no
doubt be able to continue to do so for some time
to come.
But in some ways the society in Uganda is too
developed for this to succeed indefinitely. Educa-
tion is probably more widely spread than in any
other country in the region; the peasantry has
never been reduced to servility but has always
been given some degree of autonomy; strong
co-operative structures have been built up for
marketing and other purposes across the rural
areas; memories still remain of the more active
and effective resistance to the colonial authorities
of the 1940s. Neither the Portuguese nor the
French have been able to stem the tide of African
resistance, despite the introduction of repressive
apparatus on a scale which the present Ugandan
regime would be quite unable to afford unless it
suddenly assumed a much greater degree of signi-
ficance to some foreign power than it now has.
Whether resistance movements can be developed
against an internal rather than a foreign ruling
class is the question which has now moved to the
top of the agenda. The answer to this question in
Uganda will be of much more than local signi-
ficance for Africans.
